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Abstract
Fuzzy vault is a well-known technique that is used in biometric authenti-
cation applications. This thesis handles the fuzzy vault scheme and improves
it to strengthen against previously suggested attacks while analyzing the ef-
fects of these improvements on the performance.
We compare the performances of two different methods used in the im-
plementation of fuzzy vault, namely brute force and Reed Solomon decoding
with fingerprint biometric data. We show that the locations of fake (chaff)
points leak some valuable information and propose a new chaff point place-
ment technique that prevents that information leakage. A novel method for
chaff point creation that decreases the success rate of the brute force attack
from 100% to less than 3.3% is also proposed in this work.
Moreover, a special hash function that allows us to perform matching in
the hash space which protects the biometric information against the ‘correla-
tion attack’ is proposed. Security analysis of this method is also presented in
this thesis. We implemented the scheme with and without the hash function
to calculate false accept and false reject rates in different settings.
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PARMAKI˙ZI˙ I˙C¸I˙N
FUZZY VAULT SI˙STEMI˙:
UYGULAMA, ANALI˙Z VE GELI˙S¸TI˙RMELERI˙
Cengiz O¨rencik
CS, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2008
Tez Danıs¸manı: Erkay Savas¸
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O¨zet
Fuzzy vault sistemi, biyometrik tabanlı kimlik onaylama sistemlerinde
kullanılan bilinen bir tekniktir. Bu tezde, fuzzy vault sistemini temel alarak,
bu sistemin daha o¨nce o¨nerilmis¸ saldırılara kars¸ı gu¨venlilig˜ini arttıran yeni-
likler o¨neriyoruz ve bu yeniliklerin performansa etkilerini inceliyoruz.
Fuzzy vault uygulamalarında kullanılan, kaba kuvvet ve Reed Solomon
kod c¸o¨zme isimli iki metodu, parmakizi biyometrik verisini kullanarak kars¸ılas¸tırdık.
Vault u¨zerindeki taklit noktaların yerlerinin, nemli bilgi ac¸ıg˜a c¸ıkardıg˜ını
go¨sterdik ve bu bilgi sızıntısını engelleyen yeni bir taklit nokta yerles¸tirme
methodu o¨nerdik. Ayrıca kaba kuvvet saldırısının bas¸arı oranını %100’den
%3.3’e du¨s¸u¨ren yeni bir taklit nokta yaratma methodu o¨nerdik.
Bunların haricinde, kars¸ılas¸tırmayı hash alanında yapmayı mu¨mku¨n kılan
o¨zel bir hash fonksiyonu o¨nerdik. Bu methodla, biyometrik bilgisini ‘ilis¸ki
kurma’ saldırısına kars¸ı gu¨venli hale getirdik ve bu methodun gu¨venlik anal-
izlerini yaptık. Ek olarak, bu sistemin uygulamasını hash fonksiyonu ic¸eren
ve ic¸ermeyen deg˜is¸ik ayarlarda yaparak hatalı kabul ve hatalı ret oranlarını
hesapladık.
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1 Introduction
In this age of universal connectivity, with hackers and electronic fraud, user
authentication has become a very crucial matter. The new developments in
biometric technology provides us the tools for authentication that can protect
our identity from being stolen. The aim of this research is to improve the
fuzzy vault [3] scheme to strengthen it against previously proposed as well
as new attacks while analyzing the effects of these improvements on the
performance. The research also involves comparison of the efficiencies of the
two decoding methods, namely brute force and Reed Solomon, that is used
in the implementation of fuzzy vault.
1.1 Authentication Factors
Identification for access control and other purposes can be achieved by uti-
lizing three factors:
1. What you know (e.g. passwords)
2. What you have (e.g. smartcards)
3. What you are (biometric data identifying a person)
These are called the three pillars of authentication [4]. Either these factors
can be used alone or any combination of the three can be used together to
increase security and compensate the weaknesses of one factor. The first
factor can be anything that needs to be remembered to prove your identity
such as passwords or PINs. Even though the passwords are the most common
way of authentication, they have many drawbacks: They can be forgotten,
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stolen, shared or guessed. The second factor can be any unique token which
is registered to the user who needs to possess it for authentication. There
are two kinds of tokens:
1. Storage tokens
2. Dynamic tokens
Storage tokens have a unique information that identifies its user. They
are usually used together with passwords. A common example for this kind
of authentication is the ATMs where the card (storage token) and PIN (pass-
word) is used together for authentication. This system provides better se-
curity then something you know since they can not be shared or guessed,
but still the token and the associated password can be stolen. Different from
the storage tokens, dynamic tokens generate a one-time authentication code.
This code is usually in the form of a challenge sent from the computer and
the response from the token. The dynamic tokens are usually used together
with passwords so this way of authentication still requires a password that
can be forgotten and a token that can be stolen.
Biometric is used as the third factor for authentication. A biometric is
inseparable from an individual and always accessible providing comparably
high level of security. In addition, it can easily be combined with other factors
to increase security further. Biometric identification, on the other hand, also
suffers from two major drawbacks:
1. The noisy nature of biometrics measurement process
2. Privacy issues due to the fact that biometric data reveals private in-
formation about the individuals which is not intended to be revealed
2
otherwise
The latter concern is nowadays becoming more and more important and
authorities are in the process of taking measures to protect the privacy of
individuals (e.g. Australian Biometrics Institute Privacy Code).
1.2 Biometrics and Fingerprint
Biometrics have their own terminology that is used throughout this thesis.
The basic terminology for biometrics, specifically fingerprint biometric is
explained in this section. A biometric is a physical or psychological feature
that can be measured and quantified. This quantified feature can be used
to authenticate a person with a degree of certainty by comparing different
measurements of this feature. Clearly the degree of certainty depends on the
type and quality of the biometric and the authentication algorithm used.
Fingerprint biometrics was one of the first biometrics that is used for
identification and authentication purposes. It is still widely used in many
areas and people accept that fingerprints are unique and can be used for
identification. Since it is widely used, it is crucial to have a secure fingerprint
authentication system.
Generally macro and micro features are used to identify a fingerprint
image [4]. Macro features can be seen with the naked eye but to see the
micro features, a sensor device is necessary. The macro features are used as
helper data [5] for fingerprint authentication but the minutia points that is
mainly used in fingerprint authentication are identified by the micro features.
The most common macro features are ridge patterns as illustrated in
Figure 1, core point (center point of a fingerprint) and maximum curvature
3
points. On the other hand, common minutia points (i.e. micro features) are
ridge ending, ridge bifurcation and dot (or island) as illustrated in Figure 2.
Some of the main macro and micro features are marked in Figure 3.
Figure 1: Ridge Patterns [1]
Figure 2: Micro Features [1]
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
In this thesis, we focus on several issues involving fuzzy vault implementa-
tion for biometrics usage. The first issue is to compare the computational
efficiencies of the two methods, namely brute-force and Reed Solomon (RS)
decoding methods. Another issue we deal with is to provide a step-by-step
guideline for the implementation details of fuzzy vault schemes, which has not
4
Figure 3: Macro Micro Features [2]
been given in previous works. We also analyze some security drawbacks of
the fuzzy vault scheme and propose solutions to those weaknesses as outlined
below:
• Kholmatov et al. [6] showed that it is possible to link an unknown vault
to another vault that is constructed by the same biometric by applying
the correlation attack which is explained in Section 6.3. We propose
keeping hash values of the minutia points, instead of the minutia points
themselves. The details of this proposed method is explained in Section
8.2 together with the security analysis.
• The locations of the points in the vault may reveal some information as
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to which points are genuine depending on the chaff point generation.
We propose a method in Section 7.1 that makes distinguishing genuine
points impossible.
• Mihailescu [7] pointed out that the fuzzy vault scheme is vulnerable
to brute force attack. We propose a new method in Section 7.2 to
decrease the success rate of this attack from 100% to less than 3.5%.
This countermeasure proves to be useful in certain settings.
• We study the effects of distances between chaff points and between a
chaff and a genuine point on the security and performance of the fuzzy
vault.
• We also study limitations on the vault size and its effects on the security
and performance of the fuzzy vault.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents the previous works on the fuzzy vault scheme and
briefly explains the principles of the fuzzy vault scheme. Shamir’s secret
sharing system which has a crucial importance in the fuzzy vault scheme is
also explained in this section.
In Section 3, a review of the fuzzy vault authentication scheme is given
and the details of enrollment, verification and alignment stages of this scheme
are explained in detail. We also mention different alignment methods where
any of them can be used in this authentication system.
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Section 4 explains the implementation details of the brute force and Reed
Solomon decoding algorithms [8] used for reconstructing the authentication
data hidden in the fuzzy vault. We define the Generalized Reed Solomon
codes which are used for reconstructing the secret polynomial. The decoding
algorithm for Generalized Reed Solomon codes that we used in our algorithm
is also presented in this section.
In Section 5, a comparative analysis for the performance of two techniques
used in polynomial reconstruction is provided.
In Section 6, we propose an attack called Location Based Attack that the
original fuzzy vault system is vulnerable. Also, the two previously proposed
attacks targeted on the fuzzy vault system, namely the brute force attack
and the correlation attack are visited in this section.
Section 7 outlines two proposed modifications to the enrollment stage to
increase the security of the fuzzy vault and summarizes the security analy-
sis of the scheme against brute force attack. From a given vault, the first
modification makes distinguishing genuine points impossible while the second
modification strengthen the scheme against brute force attack.
In Section 8, we propose keeping hash values of the minutia points instead
of the minutia points themselves. We introduce the requirements, a hash
function should satisfy to be used in a secure fuzzy vault scheme. We propose
a special hash function and present proofs that our proposed hash function
satisfies the necessary requirements.
Section 9 explores the effects of the vault and threshold sizes and use
of the proposed hash function on the security and fault rates of the scheme
using experimental data. It also provides a timing comparison between brute
7
force and RS decoding methods.
And finally Section 10 is devoted to our conclusions and the summary of
the thesis.
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2 Literature Survey
One of the first biometric authentication systems that uses cryptographic
techniques is proposed by Juels and Wattenberg [9] called the fuzzy com-
mitment scheme. Different from traditional cryptographic techniques, this
scheme does not require an exact match with the decryption key but a rea-
sonably close key is sufficient for decryption. In this method a secret is
hidden under a key x and the user can reveal the secret given any key x′
that is close to x in terms of Hamming distance. The minutia points of a
fingerprint can be used to construct x. Although the method tolarates some
errors in the information symbols of x, it can not tolarate re-ordering of the
symbols which is called the order-invariance property. Soutar et al. [10] also
proposed an algorithm that binds a large cryptographic key with the user’s
fingerprint image using enrollment. Given the same fingerprint, the key can
be revealed by using correlation filter functions. This scheme overcomes the
order invariance problem but with a highly inefficient method.
Juels and Sudan [3] proposed the so-called fuzzy vault scheme that over-
comes the order invariance problem in an efficient way. The main idea is
to exploit the relationship between error correction and secret sharing —
the biometric data together with a secret defines a codeword from an ap-
propriate error correction code. Given the fingerprint, the codeword can be
corrected, and the secret is extracted. However, the secret does not reveal
anything about the biometric data. If the secret is compromised, one can
always choose another secret to combine with the same biometric. The main
idea is that the biometric data is essentially used to extract a secret hidden
in the coefficients of a secret polynomial. The method for reconstructing the
9
secret polynomial is based on the Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme
[11] which utilizes polynomial evaluations at minutiae points. Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme is briefly explained in Section 2.1.
Later, Clancy et al. [12] used this fuzzy vault scheme in a secure smartcard
system. They used Reed-Solomon decoding to construct the secret polyno-
mial. The authors provide realistic expectations on the values of the security
parameters and associated attack complexity. They claim that the scheme
provides 69 bits security against a brute force attack but with the parameters
that provides this security, the error rates increase between 20 to 30 percent.
In 2004, Dodis et al. [13] propose a modification to the original fuzzy vault
scheme. They used a second polynomial p′ where the degree of p′ is higher
than p which overlaps with p only for the genuine minutia points. They
represent the vault only using the coefficients of p′ without using locations
of chaff or genuine points.
The codeword can be corrected by using brute force; but using more
sophisticated Reed-Solomon (RS) decoding method is usually assumed to be
more efficient [3], [12]. Though it is well known that the RS decoder performs
better than brute force asymptotically, it still remains to be verified whether
the brute force method or the RS decoding method performs better for fuzzy
vaults in practical implementations.
A successful application of fuzzy vault to fingerprint biometrics is due to
[14] that basically uses the brute force approach. Different from Clancy’s
work they used alignment help-data which decreases the error rates, and also
a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) embedded in a coefficient of the secret
polynomial is used to guarantee that the correct polynomial is found.
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2.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
In a (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, a secret S is divided among n
people such that any coalition of k people can successfully reveal the secret S.
Furthermore, a secret sharing mechanism is said to be perfect if a coalition
of k − 1 people cannot even reduce the candidate space to find the secret S.
Shamir’s method of interpolation of the secret polynomial is perfect since it
satisfies this property [11].
The method, firstly, requires that a polynomial f(x) = ak−1xk−1+ak−2xk−2+
. . .+a0 of degree k− 1 be generated in Zq[x] where q is a prime number that
satisfies q > k and ∀i ai < q. In the original Shamir’s method the secret is
the constant coefficient a0 of the polynomial; however, in fuzzy vault imple-
mentations the secret is the concatenation of all coefficients of the polynomial
(i.e. S = ak−1||ak−2|| . . . ||a0). The share of the ith party is yi = f(xi), for
values 1 ≤ i ≤ n where n is the number of secret shares. If k parties come
together, they can construct the polynomial and learn the secret; a coalition
of less than k parties naturally cannot reveal the secret1.
Let us assume that an attacker captures k−1 shares of the n secret shares.
For each candidate value S ′ where 0 ≤ S ′ < q, the attacker can construct a
different polynomial where each of these polynomials (i.e. the secret S) are
equally likely. Therefore, the attacker can learn nothing about the actual
value of the secret S from the k − 1 shares he captured.
1In the original Shamir’s secret sharing where the secret is the constant coefficients no
information can be gathered about the secret by a coalition of less than k parties. Thus,
the original scheme provides information theoretic security while the security properties
of the fuzzy vault are yet to be determined.
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This (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme is quite efficient when it is used
with good polynomial interpolation algorithms such as Lagrange interpolation
[15]. Moreover, this scheme has other useful properties such as:
• When the value k (degree of the secret polynomial) is kept fixed, any
number of new secret share can be added or deleted without effecting
any of the other secret shares.
• By using this secret sharing scheme, a hierarchical scheme can be es-
tablished where more important share holders have more secret shares
according to their rank in the hierarchical structure. For example, the
president of a company may have five shares, the vice president may
have 3 shares and other workers may have a single share. Then a (6,n)
threshold scheme can be enabled either by two workers, one of whom
is the president or by four workers, one of whom is vice president or by
any six workers. Although, this is a very important property, it is not
useful in the context of fuzzy vaults.
2.2 Error Correction and Detection
An error correction code C over a finite alphabet F is called an (m,M, d)
code where m is the code length, M is the code size (i.e. number of all
possible codewords) and d is the minimum Hamming distance between two
codewords c ∈ C [8].
Given an (m,M, d) code C over F, let c ∈ C be the original codeword and
y be the received word. An error is defined as the event of changing an entry
in c and the error locations are the indexes of these entries. Error correction
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decoders find the error locations and error values as long as the number of
errors is less than a threshold τ . In this work the error correction codes we
use can recover up to τ = (d − 1)/2 errors. Different from error correction
decoders, error detection decoders only indicate the error locations, without
attempting to correct them.
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3 Review of Fuzzy Vault
Juels and Sudan [3] proposed a scheme called fuzzy vault for secure biometric
authentication. The identification process using the fuzzy vault, consists of
two major stages: the enrollment and verification. The scheme is fuzzy since
the secret polynomial can be reconstructed even when the list of minutia
points of the enrolled and measured fingerprints are not exactly the same.
The biometric identification problem can be stated using an analogy with
Alice and Bob as described in [3]. The famous example is that Bob wants to
know Alice’s phone number; but Alice will give him the number only if their
taste of films matches to a certain amount. Let A denote the list of Alice’s
favorite films and B denote the list of Bob’s favorite films. An important
factor here is that the lists of favorite films are unordered sets. Alice publishes
her set A along with other random films which are not in the set A resulting
in a much bigger set A′. If Bob’s list B matches certain number of films in
the set A′ which are also members of set A, Bob will correctly receive Alice’s
phone number.
The scheme presented above is a direct analogy of the biometric verifi-
cation process with fuzzy vault. In this section we give a brief outline for
the techniques used in the application of fuzzy vault scheme to fingerprint
biometrics. As mentioned above, the identification process using the fuzzy
vault consists of two major stages: the enrollment and verification. In the
enrollment stage, the fuzzy vault is created by embedding a secret polyno-
mial after the fingerprint of the user is obtained. The fuzzy vault hides the
fingerprint and the secret polynomial which can be revealed if the same fin-
ger is used in verification. The verification stage contains two phases: 1) the
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alignment of the measured fingerprint to the points in the fuzzy vault, and 2)
the reconstruction of the secret polynomial. The enrollment and alignment
stages are the same for both brute force and RS decoding methods that differ
in the polynomial reconstruction phase.
The two stages, namely enrollment and alignment, are described briefly in
the following sections and the Section 4 is devoted to the details of polynomial
reconstruction phase. Note that these stages outline our implementation and
may differ from other fuzzy vault implementations.
3.1 Enrollment Stage
During the enrollment stage, expectedly n minutiae points from a fingerprint
are presented to the system. Two coordinates of the n genuine minutiae
points, (xi, yi) are concatenated to form integers xi = xi||yi. Each coordinate
of the minutia point is a w-bit number and thus the resulting number xi is
of length 2w-bit. The numbers xis form the minutiae space in which random
chaff points are also created. Then, chaff points are added to the vault such
that there are a total of C points with inter-Euclidean distance greater than
a threshold t. A fuzzy vault with C points is assumed to be accessible to
anyone including an external attacker.
Now, a 2kw-bit secret key S used for identification is equally divided into
k parts and each part is embedded as one coefficient of a secret polynomial
p(x) over Zq2 [x] of degree k−1 where q is a w-bit integer (Figure 4(a)). Since
the secret polynomial has degree k − 1, k points that lie on this polynomial
are sufficient to successfully reconstruct the polynomial .
For each 2w-bit number xi formed from the concatenation of coordinates
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of a minutiae point, the secret polynomial p(x) is evaluated in (mod q2)
and yi = p(xi) is obtained for each genuine point (Figure 4(b)). Then chaff
points are picked at random. And finally, these chaff points are placed in the
fuzzy vault which is a two dimensional vector space (Figure 4(c)). In other
words, for each randomly chosen 2w-bit chaff point x, a randomly chosen
y coordinate of the same size is added. Naturally, while y coordinates of
genuine points lie on the secret polynomial, y coordinates of chaff points do
not.
Since the vault contains many more chaff points than genuine points it
is computationally expensive to reconstruct the secret polynomial without
knowing the original biometric data. The steps required for the enrollment
stage are illustrated in Figure 4 and the block diagram of the original fuzzy
vault enrolling scheme is shown in Figure 5
In the implementation of [14], cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of the
secret S is added to the secret polynomial as a coefficient to guarantee that
the correct polynomial is found in the verification stage, since the polynomial
reconstruction methods may return an incorrect polynomial. However, in our
implementation we instead check if there are at least k + µ vault points lie
on the polynomial, for some µ > 1, to guarantee that the correct polynomial
is found. In our tests we see that both methods give the same False Accept
Rate (FRR) and False Reject Rate (FAR) results (Section 9).
3.2 Verification Stage
The goal of the verification stage is to reconstruct the secret polynomial
from the genuine biometric data, which is used to recover the secret key
16
(a) Create secret polynomial (b) Project elements xi onto polynomial
(c) Create random chaff points (d) Vault
Figure 4: Fuzzy Vault Scheme for Enrollment
S. The recovered secret key is then used for identification. When a user
presents a genuine fingerprint for identification, an average of m minutiae
points are expected to match the points in the vault, where m ≤ n. The
fuzziness comes from the fact that the person does not have to present the
same set of minutiae points for each verification process. This is especially
a useful feature since the fingerprint measurement is a noisy process and in
each verification a different set of measured minutiae points match the points
in the fuzzy vault. The block diagram of the original fuzzy vault verification
scheme is shown in Figure 6.
17
Figure 5: Block Diagram For Enrollment
Figure 6: Vault Verification
3.3 Alignment Phase
The verification process of the fingerprint presented to the system should
undergo some preprocessing before applying the polynomial reconstruction
algorithm. Preprocessing stage is mainly the alignment of the query finger-
print to the enrolled fingerprint stored during the enrollment phase. There
are different methods that do the alignment of the query fingerprint to the
enrolled fingerprint and the most commonly used minutia alignment methods
are explained in this section.
At the end of the alignment phase, matching points of the query finger-
print images, consisting of some genuine and some chaff points, are presented
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to the system for verification. This list is known as verification list and when
it contains at least k + µ points that matches to genuine points, the secret
polynomial can be reconstructed.
Without the alignment process, the false reject rates will be quite high
since the biometric data varies greatly in different measurements due to im-
perfections of the process. If the query fingerprint is genuine, the verification
list is mainly composed of genuine points from the enrollment phase with a
small number of chaff points.
Aligning two fingerprints is a difficult task and errors in this phase could
lead to false rejects. There are several different approaches for fingerprint
alignment and the most commonly used ones are as follows:
• by using reference points
• by using helper data
• by exhaustive search
3.3.1 Alignment by Reference Points
Yang and Verbauwhede [16], constructed an automatic secure fingerprint
verification system based on the fuzzy vault scheme where the most reliable
reference points are chosen from the enrolled and query templates and aligned
in the alignment phase. There is a high noise due to shifting and rotation on
the position of minutia points that are obtained by a fingerprint sensor. Yang
and Verbauwhede overcame this problem by observing the minutia points in
the Polar coordinate system instead of observing in the Cartesian coordinate
system. By choosing the origin of the Polar coordinate system correctly,
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they can obtain a system independent of the translation and rotation of the
input fingerprint images. They used a rotation and translation invariant that
is a function of r, θ and ϕ where r is the distance between two minutia, θ
is the position angle, and ϕ is the direction difference between a minutia
and the origin. Assume the local feature vectors of the ith minutia of the
fingerprint A and jth minutia of the fingerprint B are given as MA(i) and
MB(j) respectively. Their similarity level is calculated with the following
formula:
s(i, j) =
 1−
|MA(i)−MB(j)|W
T (W )
, if |MA(i)−MB(j)|W < T (W )
0, otherwise
where |MA(i)−MB(j)|W is the weighted distance between two local fea-
ture vectors, W is a weight vector and T (W ) is a fixed threshold related to
this weight vector.
The algorithm calculates all s(i, j) values and choose the pair with the
largest similarity level as referance pair. Then the minutia points are con-
verted in a polar system. The polar coordinates of the query fingerprint is
used in the verification phase. Though this alignment based on reference
point is computationally efficient, finding a reliable point requires at least 3
templates during enrollment of a fingerprint and still errors may occur that
leads to false rejects. To avoid that problem, an additional information from
the fingerprint, called the helper data, can be used in the alignment phase.
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3.3.2 Alignment by Helper Data
Uludag et al. [5] implemented a fuzzy vault system that uses helper data
that is automatically extracted from the fingerprints, later Nandakumar et
al. [17] used helper data that is constructed in the same way as Uludag for
the alignment phase of fuzzy vault. They used the Orientation Field Flow
Curves (OFFC) [18] since they are robust to noise. First an orientation field
is set and a flow curve is found where an orientation field flow curve is a
set of linear segments whose tangent direction is parallel to the orientation
field direction at each point. The set of flow curves is found by calculating
many flow curves each with a different starting point and from each curve,
the point that has the maximum curvature value is found. The helper data
is composed of these points with maximum curvature values. In this method
the helper data must be constructed both for the enrolled fingerprint and for
the query fingerprint.
After the helper data is extracted from the fingerprint, the points with
very high and very low curvature are filtered out that gives the final version
of the helper data. In the alignment phase, the helper data extracted from
the enrolled fingerprint (HE) and the one extracted from query fingerprint
(HQ) are aligned with each other by using an Iterative Closest Point (ICP)
based algorithm [19]. The details of the alignment algorithm is presented in
[17].
Note that the helper data is kept as public information, therefore, it
should not reveal any information about the minutia points that might com-
promise the security. The maximum curvature points are macro features of
a fingerprint that are independent from the minutia points which are mi-
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cro features as previously explained in Section 1.2. Therefore, the authors
claim that helper data should not leak any information about the minutia
attributes of a fingerprint. However, this information can still be used to de-
crease the search area of the vault and make the system even more vulnerable
to brute force attack which is explained in Section 6.2.
3.3.3 Alignment by Exhaustive Search
The exhaustive search method does not require any helper data or reference
points but only uses the minutia location coordinates of the fingerprints. All
the translation in x and y coordinates plus the rotation variants of the points
of query fingerprint are compared with the points in the vault. If a point
in the query fingerprint is closer to a template point than certain number
of pixels in the image we assume that the two points are matched; therefore
the tested point is stored as the matching point. This process is repeated for
many different combinations of translated and rotated fingerprint images and
the combination with maximum number of matching points are the output
of the alignment phase.
The exhaustive search method is not an efficient method compared to
the other two methods but it can make quite accurate alignment. The False
Accept and False Reject Rates given in Section 9 are calculated by using
this alignment method. However, all the contributions given in this thesis
are independent of the alignment method and any alignment method (i.e.
matching algorithm) can be used instead of the currently used exhaustive
search method to obtain faster matching results.
We devote the next section to the polynomial reconstruction method, for
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which two methods (i.e. brute force and Reed-Solomon decoding) can be
applied.
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4 Polynomial Reconstruction Phase
There are two methods employed to reconstruct the secret polynomial, namely
brute force and Reed-Solomon decoding. Both methods essentially apply the
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [11] in the reconstruction of the secret poly-
nomial. The shares of the secret S correspond to the genuine points in the
vault which are not discernible among the many chaff points (fake shares).
A genuine fingerprint reveals sufficient number of genuine shares and these
shares are used in the polynomial reconstruction methods to recover the se-
cret polynomial.
Note that the fuzzy vault does not exactly provide the same type of secu-
rity as Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. Shamir’s scheme provides information
theoretic security since the secret in this scheme is embedded as only a single
coefficient of the secret polynomial while in the fuzzy vault the secret is the
concatenation of all coefficients.
4.1 Brute Force Approach
To reconstruct the secret polynomial using brute force approach requires
trying many of the combinations of k out of given m matching points. Note
that some of the m matching minutiae points are the ones that actually
match random chaff points in the fuzzy vault. When k minutiae points that
match the real minutiae points are found during the exhaustive search, the
scheme is said to be successful.
In brute force approach, first k pairs of (xi, yi) are chosen randomly from
the verification list and the polynomial on which the selected k pairs lie
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is calculated using Lagrange interpolation method. Then whether µ of the
remaining vault points satisfies yi = p(xi) is tested. If more points that lie on
the same polynomial are found, the fingerprint is verified; otherwise rejected.
If insufficient number of pairs satisfy yi = p(xi) condition, another random k
pairs are taken as input and the process is repeated. The maximum number
of trials is set to a high value, after which the program rejects the fingerprint
if no polynomial satisfying the condition is found. The drawback of the brute
force approach is high computation complexity when the query fingerprint is
too noisy which cause lower genuine matches and higher chaff matches.
4.2 Reed Solomon Decoding Approach
Utilizing error correcting codes for the implementation of fuzzy vault is first
proposed by [3]. The authors state that after matching minutiae points are
obtained, use of Reed-Solomon (RS) decoder is a more efficient approach than
the brute force. The Reed-Solomon decoders have an error correction capa-
bility of τ = m−k
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errors. Even though the Guruswami-Sudan list decoding
algorithm [20] [21] can correct errors beyond this limit (τGS =
√
mk), it is not
suitable to our case due to efficiency reasons. The best choice to implement
RS decoder is to use the Berlekamp-Massey (BM) algorithm as explained
also in [12] since it is fast, easy to implement and widely studied. Moreover,
for the parameters used in the fuzzy vault scheme the error correction ca-
pacity of Gruswami-Sudan’s algorithm is very close to Berlekamp-Massey’s
algorithm.
However, details of the RS decoding method, are given neither in [3] nor
in [12]. These papers mention the decoder, named UNLOCK function, as
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a black box that reconstructs the secret polynomial given the m matching
points. The lack of detailed description of the method caused some misun-
derstanding in literature; for instance [22] claim that Reed-Solomon decoding
is not applicable in the case of fuzzy vault scheme. To clarify the misunder-
standing, the Reed Solomon codes and Reed Solomon decoding method used
for the fuzzy vault scheme is explained here in detail.
4.2.1 Generalized Reed Solomon Codes
A Generalized Reed-Solomon (RS) code [8] over the finite field F = GF (q2),
is a linear code CRS over F with a parity check matrix
HRS =

1 1 . . . 1
x1 x2 . . . xm
x1
2 x2
2 . . . xm
2
...
...
...
...
x1
m−k−1 x2m−k−1 . . . xmm−k−1


v1 0 . . . 0
0 v2
...
...
. . . 0
0 . . . 0 vm
 ,
where x1, x2, . . . , xm are distinct nonzero elements in F , and v1, v2, . . . , vm
are nonzero elements in F that are not necessarily distinct. The elements
xi are called the code locators and vi are column multipliers. The matrix
HRS is called the canonical parity check matrix of CRS. A canonical parity
check matrix is not unique, even up to scaling of column multipliers, due to
the fact that the same RS code can be defined through more than one list
of code locators. However, we give a method to calculate a canonical parity
check matrix in Section 4.2.2.
The conventional Reed Solomon codes are not suitable for fuzzy vault
decoding since they require an element α where α is an element of multi-
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plicative order m in F to create the generator [23]. Note that m (number of
minutia points matched) is not a predefined value and may differ for every
user which makes conventional RS codes not suitable for fuzzy vault.
As explained in the enrollment stage, when we construct the fuzzy vault
we evaluate the secret polynomial for all n minutiae points, i.e. yi = p(xi)
for i = 1, . . . n. This can be put into a matrix-vector formulation as follows:[
y1 y2 . . . yn
]
=
[
p0 p1 . . . pk−1
]
G
where the matrix G is given as
G =

1 1 . . . 1
x1 x2 . . . xn
x1
2 x2
2 . . . xn
2
...
...
...
...
x1
k−1 x2k−1 . . . xnk−1

This is indeed a shortened RS encoding with the generator matrix G. It
is crucial to notice that the generator matrix changes for each user, which
differ from the conventional application of RS encoding method. Since the
enrollment stage essentially utilizes the RS encoding, the reconstruction of
the secret polynomial in the verification stage can be achieved by employing
an RSDecoder.
The codeword to decode in the fuzzy vault scheme is the evaluation of a
polynomial of degree k − 1 over a set of m distinct points in field F . The
codeword consists of m pairs (xi, yi) where xi ∈ F is the minutiae point that
matches either a genuine or chaff point in the fuzzy vault. If the codeword
satisfies yi 6= p(xi) for less than τ of the given values of i, the decoder
27
returns the secret polynomial P (x) and thus the fingerprint will be verified.
Otherwise, the decoder returns a false polynomial.
4.2.2 RS Decoding with BM Algorithm
The RS decoding with BM algorithm takes two vectors (X = [x1, x2, . . . , xm]
and Y = [y1, y2, . . . , ym]) where X is the code used to create the parity check
matrix and Y is the codeword with errors. The method has four major steps
[8]:
1. Computation of canonical parity-check matrix
2. Computation of syndromes
3. Computation of error locater polynomial and error locations
4. Computation of secret polynomial
Firstly, a canonical parity-check matrix H of the GRS code is an (m −
k)×m matrix such that HGT = GHT = 0. H can be constructed as follows
[8]:
H =

1 1 . . . 1
x1 x2 . . . xm
x1
2 x2
2 . . . xm
2
...
...
...
...
x1
m−k−1 x2m−k−1 . . . xmm−k−1

·V
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where V is a diagonal matrix with the vector [v1, v2, . . . , vm] being on its
diagonal and
vj = −
( ∏
1≤l≤m and l 6=j
(xj − xl)
)−1
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
As the second step, the syndromes of the vector Y with respect to H are
computed as follows: 
S0
S1
...
Sm−k
 = HY
T
If there are no errors in the vector Y, the syndromes will be all zero
vector. In this case the decoding algorithm will jump to step 4 since there
are no errors to find. Otherwise, the BM algorithm is used to find the error
locater polynomial (ELP ) which is defined as Λ(x) =
∏
j∈J(1 − xjx) where
J is the set of error locations. Note that Λ(xi
−1) = 0 ⇐⇒ i ∈ J .
The Berlekamp Massey algorithm (BM) given in Algorithm 1 computes
ELP given the syndrome polynomial S(x) =
∑m−k
i=0 Six
i.
Here, given S(x) and n, the algorithm computes i-recurrences (σ−1(x),ω−1(x))
of S(x) iteratively up to n where n-recurrence of S(x) is an ordered pair of
polynomials (σ(x),ω(x)) such that σ(0) = 1 and σ(x)S(x) ≡ ω(x) (mod xn).
After the ELP is obtained, the roots of the error locater polynomial can be
calculated by substituting the inverse of each element of vector X for Λ(x)
and checking for zero. This method works since Λ(xi
−1) = 0 ⇐⇒ i ∈ J
(i.e. there is an error in ith location of the codeword). Since ELP shows
the locations of all errors, the rest of the data must be correct, namely
∀i /∈ J yi = p(xi).
29
Algorithm 1 Berlekamp Massey Algorithm
Require: S(x) syndrome polynomial
Ensure: ELP ⇒ Λ(x) = ∏j∈J(1− xjx)
1: n← degree of S(x) + 1;
2: σ−1(x)← 0; σ0(x)← 1;
3: ω−1(x)← −x−1; ω0(x)← 0;
4: µ← −1; δ−1 ← −1;
5: for i from 0 to n− 1 by 1 do
6: δi ← coefficient of xi in σi(x)S(x);
7: σi+1(x)← σi(x)− (δi/δµ) · xi−µ · σµ(x);
8: ωi+1(x)← ωi(x)− (δi/δµ) · xi−µ · ωµ(x);
9: if (δi 6= 0) AND (max(σi, ωi + 1) ≤ i) then
10: µ← i;
11: end if
12: end for
13: return σn(x)
Finally, the secret polynomial can be reconstructed by using the Lagrange
interpolation method with the correct minutiae points if the number of errors
does not exceed τ . Otherwise, the function returns a wrong polynomial of
degree k− 1. Again we check if more points that lie on the same polynomial
exist. If not, the function is called with fewer number of pairs. This process is
repeated a few times with some of the different random pairs being removed
from the list. If the algorithm still returns a wrong polynomial as output
after these attempts, then the fingerprint is rejected.
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5 Computational Complexity of Polynomial
Reconstruction
In [12], Clancy et al. argue that using the RS decoder is a better approach
than the brute force method if the attacker cannot eliminate some of the
chaff points from the verification list. But the authors do not provide a
comparison between the two approaches. In this thesis we try to clarify as
to which method is optimal depending on the parameters of m and k where
m is the number of matched points and k − 1 is the degree of the secret
polynomial.
For comparing the two approaches, we calculate the number of operations
in the secret polynomial reconstruction phase for both methods. For the sake
of simplicity, we ignore addition and assignment operations and only count
multiplication and inverse operations in Fq2 since the latter two operations
dominate the computation.
5.1 Complexity of the RS Decoder
The Reed Solomon decoder has four steps as explained in section 4.2 and
the complexity of each step and the total complexity is given in Table 1.
We assume that Step 3 always returns an error locater polynomial; i.e. the
measured fingerprint always leads to matchings to chaff points.
From the perspective of complexity comparison, the main difference be-
tween the brute force and the RS decoding approaches is that RS decoder can
distinguish a genuine fingerprint in only one trial if the number of incorrect
matchings is less than the error correcting capability of the RS code τ . On
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Table 1: Operational Complexity of RS Decoding Method.
Step Multiplication Inv.
1. Constructing H(total) 3m2 − 2mk m
2. Syndrome Computation m(m− k) -
3. Finding Error Locations m(k2/3 + 2) -
4. Polynomial Construction k2 -
Total 4m2 +m(k2/3) m
−m(3k + 2) + k2
the other hand, the brute force approach may have to perform excessively
many trials to complete the verification process.
5.2 Complexity of the Brute Force Method
Complexity of the brute force method is given in Table 2. Selecting k ran-
dom points out of m matched points (i.e. Step 1 in the table) involves
a randomized algorithm, whose complexity we estimate as equivalent to k
multiplication operations. The variable l in the last row of Table 2 stands for
the number of trials needed on average, which naturally increases with the
error in the query fingerprint. Without knowing the number of trials l in the
brute force method it is not easy to compare two methods. Comparison is
only possible with experiments on real and synthetic data, which we achieve
in Section 9. However, it is important to note that one round of brute force
is faster than Reed Solomon method.
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Table 2: Operational Complexity of Brute Force Method
Phase Multiplication Inv.
1. Choosing k random points k -
2. Polynomial Construction k2 -
3. Verification of the result 5m -
Total l(k2 + 5m+ k) -
6 Attacks on Fuzzy Vault
Although Juels and Sudan [3] proved that the fuzzy vault scheme satisfies
some security properties, it is still vulnerable to some attacks. The attacks
on the fuzzy vault scheme, mostly assume the interception of a vault from a
database. There are several attacks targeted on the fuzzy vault scheme such
as the brute force attack and the correlation attack which can be applied
in reasonable amount of time. Therefore, the fuzzy vault scheme is insecure
without additional security measures.
6.1 Location Based Attack
The vault involves the location of all the points, either chaff or genuine.
Therefore, creation of random chaff points is crucial since they should be
uniformly distributed in the minutiae space so that an attacker, having ac-
cess to the vault, should not be able to distinguish between genuine minutiae
points and random chaff points [24]. In the original scheme proposed by [3],
the chaff points were created with the condition that every point in the vault
should be at least t Euclidean distance apart to supply a uniform distribu-
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tion. However, in this method the fuzzy vault could leak some information
about the location of genuine points. We have no control over the locations
of genuine points, as some of them might be very close to each other as exem-
plified in Figure 7 where chaff points are represented as circles and genuine
points as circles with crosses.
Figure 7: Original Fuzzy Vault where genuine points are marked
If an attacker intercepts a vault, he can locate some of the genuine points
correctly by checking the distances between the points; i.e. if the distance
between two points is closer than the threshold t, then these points are gen-
uine. Although this attack may not be sufficient to find the secret polynomial
since the number of identified genuine points will probably less then k, it will
highly reduce the complexity of the brute force attack that is explained in
Section 6.2.
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6.2 Brute Force Attack
If an attacker intercepts a vault, but has no other information about the
locations of the genuine points, the best method to recover the secret poly-
nomial is brute force trial [12][7]. Mihailescu provides a strong brute force
attack in [7], which finds the secret polynomial in less than 8(Ck)(C/n)k
operations where C is the number of points in the vault, n is the number of
genuine points in the vault and the degree of the secret polynomial is k − 1.
The idea of the attack relies on the established fact [3] that when there are
more than D vault points on a polynomial of degree k− 1 for a fixed thresh-
old D ∈ (k − 1, n), this polynomial is the secret polynomial with a very
high probability. In this attack, the intruder chooses random k points from
the vault, where k − 1 is the degree of the secret polynomial and finds the
polynomial that these k points lie on. Later he tests how many other vault
points lie on that polynomial, if it is greater or equal to D, he claims this
is the secret polynomial and all the points that lie on that polynomial are
genuine minutia points of the enrolled fingerprint. Otherwise, the attacker
choose another random k points and repeats the operation until he finds a
polynomial that has more than D points that lie on it.
6.3 Correlation Attack
Scheirer et al. [25] suggested another kind of attack called attack via record
multiplicity. This kind of attack assumes that the attacker intercepts at least
two fuzzy vaults that belongs to the same user. Note that these vaults may
be created by different secret polynomials and different chaff points but the
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genuine points should highly overlap since they are the minutia points of
the same fingerprint. Scheirer claimed that correlating these two vaults may
reveal the biometric data (i.e. minutia points). Later, Kholmatov et al. [6]
showed that by using this property of the fuzzy vault scheme, it is possible
to link an unknown vault to another vault that is constructed by the same
biometric in a reasonable amount of time with high probability. Kholmatov
et al. calculated that given two matching vaults, the secret polynomial can
be revealed 59% of the time.
Due to this reason, some additional security measures are necessary for
a secure fuzzy vault scheme. Recently Nandakumar et al. [26] implemented
the fuzzy vault scheme by combining it with passwords. This scheme suc-
cessfully overcomes the vulnerability of the scheme against correlation attack
without increasing the false reject rates. However, this system is a two factor
authentication scheme where the user has to provide both the password and
the biometric during authentication and that maybe inconvenient in certain
applications.
In this thesis we propose methods that improves the security of the scheme
against all three attacks, namely location based attack, brute force attack
and correlation attack. We changed the threshold settings as explained in
Section 7.1 for securing the scheme against location based attack. A novel
chaff point placement method in Section 7.2 is proposed as a remedy for
brute force attack. For a remedy against correlation attack, we keep distorted
versions of the biometric that preserves the invariants of the biometric image.
The details of this method is explained in Section 8.2.
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7 New Enrollment Stage
In this section, we explain two proposed modifications to the enrollment stage
in order to strengthen the fuzzy vault against possible attacks.
7.1 Distribution of Chaff Points
As previously explained in Section 6.1, some of the genuine points can be
identified by just examining the locations of points relative to their neigh-
boring points. As a remedy, we generate the chaff points with the condition
that every chaff point in the vault should be at least at Euclidean distance t
from a genuine point and should be at least at Euclidean distance t′ from any
other chaff point. Note that t′ < t since having chaff points far from the gen-
uine points is necessary and have a positive effect on false reject rate (FRR)
as demonstrated in Section 9. Smaller threshold t′, on the other hand, for
inter-chaff point distance is necessary to imitate the distribution of genuine
points where close genuine points occasionally occur in the vault. While t
value depends on the fingerprint image size and the total number of points
in the vault, t′ should be chosen depending on the distribution of genuine
points. For fingerprint image of 500 × 500 pixels, Figure 8 shows the fuzzy
vault constructed with the new chaff point placement strategy, where the
threshold values t and t′ are chosen as 18 and 8, respectively. As seen in Fig-
ure 8, the distribution of chaff points in the fuzzy vault closely resembles the
distribution of genuine points, hence an attacker cannot easily distinguish
the genuine points from the chaff points.
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Figure 8: Fuzzy vault with new scheme where genuine points are marked
7.2 A Novel Method for Chaff Point Placement
As explained in Section 6.2, Mihailescu proved that in less than 8Ck(C/n)k
operations2, the intruder can recover the secret polynomial [7]. Note that
there are C points in the vault where n of them are genuine and the secret
polynomial has degree k − 1.
Our proposed method to improve the security involves the idea that, by
choosing the chaff points at random, but in a more clever way, we can embed
some other (randomly chosen) polynomials of degree k − 1 other than the
secret polynomial in the vault. If we guarantee that the number of chaff
points that lie on these (fake) polynomials, is around n — the same number
of genuine points on the secret polynomial on average — the attacker cannot
distinguish the secret polynomial from the fake ones. Otherwise the attacker
2Operation means atomic arithmetic operations such as additions and multiplications.
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who succeeds to construct a polynomial can discard it if there are fewer
points. One way of choosing chaff points is described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for chaff point selection
1: Place the genuine points in the vault
2: Keep the unassigned chaff points in a pool
3: Keep a list of fake polynomials which is initially empty
4: repeat
5: Pick a random number r close to n
6: For the first fake polynomial, take random k− 1 points from the vault
and take one random point from the pool. For others take random k
points from the vault.
7: Find the (k − 1)st degree polynomial that passes through the selected
points. Add the polynomial to the list if it is not already in it.
8: Check the vault if there are any other points that lie on the polynomial.
Decrement r by the number of points on this polynomial.
9: Pick r points from the pool (or the remaining points if their number
is less than r) and place them on the fake polynomial and place the
resulting values in the fuzzy vault.
10: until the pool is empty
With the proposed chaff placement method, we allow each polynomial to
intersect with other polynomials in at least k vault points which increases
the maximum number of polynomials we can embed into the vault. Note
that no two polynomials can intersect with each other in more than k − 1
points. Since each of the embedded polynomial is of the same degree and has
similar number of vault points that lies on it, they are equally likely to be
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the secret polynomial. Therefore by increasing the number of embedded fake
polynomials, we reduce the probability that the attacker successfully guess
the secret polynomial. As a result of our experiments in our setting described
above, we are able to hide around 30 fake polynomials in the vault. There-
fore, this method decreases the probability of finding the secret polynomial
using Mihailescu’s attack from 100% to approximately 3.3% after the brute
force attack is applied. Due to the fact that most of the identification appli-
cations only allow a limited number of trials, the proposed method enhances
the security considerably. Moreover, the method does not affect the false
accept or false reject rates since the matching algorithm considers only the
x coordinates of the points and this method changes only the y coordinates.
7.3 Security against Brute Force Attacks
As explained in Section 6.2, there is an efficient brute force attack that
can find the secret polynomial and the biometric information in less than
8(Ck)(C/n)k operations where C is the number of points in the vault, n
is the number of genuine points in the vault and the degree of the secret
polynomial is k − 1.
In our tests the parameter n is on average 35 and k is constant 10. For
C = 300, which gives a better FRR, breaking the system requires 8× 300×
10 × (300/35)10 ≈ 246 operations. For C = 350, which gives a worse FRR,
the system provides a better security; breaking the system requires this time
8× 350× 10× (350/35)10 ≈ 248 operations.
Without the use of the proposed method in Section 7.2, the secret poly-
nomial is found with probability 1 after this attack. However, our proposed
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method decrease the probability to approximately 0.03 since the polynomial
found as a result of brute force attack, is not guaranteed to be the secret
polynomial.
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8 Preventing Correlation Attacks
As explained in Section 6.3, the fuzzy vault system is vulnerable against the
correlation attack and some additional security measures are necessary for a
secure fuzzy vault system. We propose a special hash function for keeping the
hash values of the minutia points and perform the matching in hash space.
In this section, we first define the requirements a hash function should satisfy
to be used in a secure fuzzy vault scheme and propose a hash function that
overcomes the vulnerability against correlation attack.
8.1 Requirements of the Hash Function
Due to the correlation attack against fuzzy vault, we should randomize the
minutia points. One well-known method for randomization is encryption but
this requires the safeguarding of the private keys which is another problem.
Use of hash values of the minutia points, instead of the minutia points them-
selves is an efficient method for randomization and this method does not
require safeguarding of keys since everything is public. In this section, we
define the key properties that a hash function should satisfy to be used in a
secure fuzzy vault implementation. We define a family of 3D-hash-functions
as a set H = {hi : Zq2 → Zp3}i where p < q. We represent the hash of a
point with h(x, y) and hV (x, y) represents the hash of all the minutia points
together with the chaff points (i.e. the vault). We use Chebyshev distance
[27] (also called infinity norm distance) to measure the distance between two
points in a vault. Here, the distance between two vectors is the greatest
of their differences along x and y coordinates. The Chebyshev distance be-
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tween two vectors or points v and w, with standard coordinates vi and wi,
respectively, is:
||v − w||∞ = max(|vi − wi|).
Any hash function that is used for biometrics should satisfy the following
properties:
1. Verifying a legitimate user should be possible (Robustness)
2. It should be secure against correlation attack (Non Linkability)
3. It should not be possible to learn the original biometric from the hashed
version of it (Non-Invertability)
The formal definitions for these properties are explained below.
Definition 1. Robustness
Given two very similar fingerprint images (i.e. one is the noisy version
of the other one), for any hash function h ∈ H the possibility that their
hash values are also very similar should be large. The formal definition is as
follows:
||(x, y)− (x′, y′)||∞ < δ ⇒ Ph∈RH [||h(x, y)− h(x′, y′)||∞ < ] > 1− σ (1)
where σ = p() for some polynomial p.
Given a vault, V , and a set of vaults, S, where exactly one vault V ′ ∈ S,
is created from the same fingerprint as V , with a different hash function from
the set H, the probability of matching V ′ to V in polynomial time should
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be at most 1/|S| + , for some security parameter . This requirement is
formalized in the following definition.
Definition 2. Non-Linkability
Let d be the average distance between a point and its nearest neighbor
in the vaults (under the assumption that each vault has the same number
of points, we can further assume that the average distance is the same for
all vaults). Here we consider the worst case and assumed that there is no
noise between the two enrolled fingerprints. We can give the formula of the
definition as follows:
Px,y∈Zq ,h,h′∈H [||h(x, y)− h′(x, y)||∞ ≤ d/2] <  (2)
Intuitively the definition says that, given a minutia point hashed by dif-
ferent functions, the possibility to correlate the two points is very low.
Definition 3. Non-Invertability
Given a hash value v = h(x, y) there is no unique point in the pre-images
of v.
Ph∈RH [x
′ = x, y′ = y|h(x, y) = h(x′, y′)] < φ for some φ < 1/2 (3)
8.2 Our Hash Function
Let Rα,β,γ be a 3×3 rotation matrix which rotate real-valued vectors by angles
of α, β, γ, around x, y and z axis respectively which is calculated as:
Rα,β,γ =

1 0 0
0 cos α -sin α
0 sin α cos α


cos β 0 sin β
0 1 0
-sin β 0 cos β


cos γ -sin γ 0
sin γ cos γ 0
0 0 1

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and M i represents the ith row of some matrix M . For integers q and pi,
where q > pi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and pi are prime numbers, we define a family
of hash functions H = {hα,β,γ : Zq2 → Zpi3}α,β,γ as:
[hα,β,γ(x, y)]
i = round(Riα,β,γ(x, y, 1)
T ) mod pi, for i = 1, 2, 3 (4)
where round function maps a real number to the closest integer and n is the
number of minutia points. In this work we choose the primes between q/2
and q/5, which achieves low FRR values while satisfying the necessary secu-
rity. According to the prime number theorem [28], there are approximately
x/log(x) primes not exceeding x. This gives us around ( q/2
log(q/2)
) − ( q/5
log(q/5)
)
possible candidates for pi.
The block diagram of the proposed fuzzy vault enrolling and verification
scheme is shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10, respectively.
Figure 9: Proposed Vault Enrolling
Note that the proposed verification is different from the original scheme
only in the alignment phase, where the proposed alignment phase first hashes
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Figure 10: Proposed Vault Verification
the query points and then aligns them with the vault. The details of the
alignment phase are given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm of the alignment phase
1: for all rotations and translations do
2: Apply a rotation and translation to the query minutia points
3: Hash them with the public hash function
4: Compare the distance with Hashed Vault points
5: if #matched points is larger than maximum matched then
6: Update maximum matched and keep this set of points
7: end if
8: end for
8.3 Analysis of The Hash Function
A hash function should satisfy the three properties given in Section 8.1.
We claim that the hash function we proposed in Section 8.2 satisfies these
properties.
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Lemma 1. (Robustness) Given two points where the Chebyshev distance
between them is less than δ, our proposed hash function is robust according
to Definition 1.
Proof. Let the hashing matrix be:
Rα,β,γ =

a1 b1 c1
a2 b2 c2
a3 b3 c3
 , (5)
where all elements of R are real numbers between [-1,1].
Assume (x, y) and (x′, y′) are two points where the Chebyshev distance
between them is less than δ. This implies that |x− x′| < δ and |y − y′| < δ.
From this we can trivially derive the following inequalities:
|x− x′| < δ ⇒ −δ < ai|x− x′| < δ since −1 < ai < 1
|y − y′| < δ ⇒ −δ < bi|y − y′| < δ since −1 < bi < 1
Recall that ||h(x, y)−h(x′, y′)||∞ =max(|(aix+ biy+ ci) mod pi− (aix′+
biy
′ + ci) mod pi|) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Let σ be:
b q
pi
c2δ/q < 2δ
pi
(i.e. σ is an approximation to the probability (aix+ biy +
ci) ≥ kpi and (aix′ + biy′ + ci) < kpi or vice versa for some k ≤ b qpi c.) Note
that since we assume x and y are uniformly distributed and pi is a prime
number, (aix+ biy + ci) mod pi should also be uniformly distributed. There
are b q
pi
c points r where r = kpi for some positive integer k ≤ b qpi c and given
the value (aix + biy + ci), the distance between this value and the value
(aix
′ + biy′ + ci) can at most be 2δ.
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With probability 1− σ:
||h(x, y)− h(x′, y′)||∞ = max(|(ai|x− x′|+ bi|y − y′|)| mod pi)
< aiδ + biδ < 2δ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Given that, ||(x, y)− (x′, y′)||∞ < δ, Ph∈RH [||h(x, y)− h(x′, y′)||∞ < ] >
1− σ for some  < 2δ and σ < 2δ
pi
Lemma 2. (Non-Linkability) Given a minutia point, the two hashed vault
points created by our proposed hash function, that uses the same minutia
point but different α, β, γ values, are not linkable according to Definition 2
given above.
Proof. Let d be given, and let
Rα,β,γ =

a1 b1 c1
a2 b2 c2
a3 b3 c3
 and R′α′,β′,γ′ =

a′1 b
′
1 c
′
1
a′2 b
′
2 c
′
2
a′3 b
′
3 c
′
3

be random variables describing the choice of hashing matrices for h and h′
respectively.
We let C be the event ‖h(x, y)−h′(x, y)‖∞ ≤ d/2, and let Dτ be the event
that the maximum of the angle differences: |α − α′|, |β − β′|, or |γ − γ′| is
larger than τ or pi 6= p′i and also let Dτ be the converse event of Dτ .
P [C] = P [C|Dτ ]P [Dτ ] + P [C|Dτ ]P [Dτ ]
≤ P [C|Dτ ] + P [Dτ ] (6)
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If we fix Rα,β,γ, there are (360/2τ)
3 = (180/τ)3 possible rotation matrices,
R′α′,β′,γ′ and ([(
q/2
log(q/2)
)− ( q/5
log(q/5)
)])3 pi triplets which fall in the event Dτ . So
the probability P [Dτ ] = ((180τ )× [( q/2log(q/2))− ( q/5log(q/5))])−3.
P [C|Dτ ] is equal to the probability that a randomly chosen point in Zpi3
is in the δ range (i.e. matched) to a fixed point since the hashed minutia
points are uniformly distributed over Zpi3 .
P [C|Dτ ] = (2δpi )3.
Putting it all together, we can write (6) as
P [C] < P [C|Dτ ] + P [Dτ ]
<
(
2δ
pi
)3
+
((
180
τ
)[(
q/2
log( q
2
)
)
−
(
q/5
log( q
5
)
)])−3
(7)
Setting  equal to the upper bound of P [C] shown in (7) completes the
proof.
Lemma 3. (Non-Invertability) Given a point (x, y),there is no unique point
in the pre-images of the hash value v = h(x, y) if h ∈ H, therefore our hash
function is not invertible according to Definition 3 above.
Proof. While hashing the vault, we are multiplying the vector (x, y, 1)T with
a 3×3 rotation matrix in modulo pi. The adversary can apply the following
attack to guess the x and y values where x and y are coordinates of one point
(i.e. either chaff or genuine) in the vault.
Assume:
round(Rα,β,γ(x, y, 1)
T ) = (x′, y′, z′) and
x′ = a mod p1, y′ = b mod p2, z′ = c mod p3 (i.e. hα,β,γ(x, y) = (a, b, c))
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The adversary can try all possible values of x′, y′ and z′ by adding or
subtracting pi values and find which of these triplets satisfy the following
condition:
R−1(x′, y′, z′) = (x, y, z) where 0 < x, y < q and z = 1
However, due to the rounding operation, satisfying z = 1 exactly is not
possible so the attacker must consider the x, y values that satisfies 1−E < z <
1 +E where E is an error threshold which do not give a unique solution.
Our empirical results show that a reasonable value for E is 2, and we
tested that the number of x, y pairs that satisfies this condition is on the
average 6 and never less than 4. Therefore, we expect that a hash value of
each point has at least f = 4 pre-images. In the worst case the adversary
has to perform fC matching to verify that two fuzzy vaults match (where
C is the number of points in the vault). This is clearly infeasible, since the
complexity grows exponentially in the size of the vault.
8.4 Security Analysis against Correlation Attack
The correlation attack that is suggested by Scheirer et al. [25] depends on
identifying the genuine points that are common in both vaults by correlating
the x values in two vaults. The correlation of x values in two vaults is done
by exhaustive matching [6] where the matching algorithm tries many possible
rotations and translations and chooses the one that maximizes the number
of matching points in two vaults. This algorithm can only be applied if the
vaults can be rotated and translated without loosing precision, for performing
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exhaustive matching algorithm. However, this is not possible in our proposed
fuzzy vault scheme with hashing.
Assume that an attacker captures two fuzzy vaults (v1, v2) that are created
by using the same biometric data but with different hash functions (R1, R2).
In the worst case there will be no noise (i.e. rotation and translation) between
two impressions of the same fingerprint and the randomly chosen modulo
values will be equal.
v1 = round(R1(x, y, 1)
T
n×3) mod p
v2 = round(R2(x, y, 1)
T
n×3) mod p
Since rotation matrices are invertible there exist some matrix R3 such
that R1 = R3 ∗ R2. If fuzzy vaults are rotatable without loosing precision
then the equation v1 ≈ round(R3 ∗ v2) mod p should hold with some small
error due to rounding. Although modulo is a congruence relation (respecting
addition, subtraction, and multiplication) on the integers, this relation is not
valid in real numbers.
Note that if a ≡ a2 mod p and b ≡ b2 mod p, where a, b ∈ Z then:
(ab) mod p ≡ (a mod p× b mod p) mod p ≡ (a2b2) mod p
However, this equivalence relation does not hold where a, b ∈ R. Assume
that a = pa1 + a2 + a3 and b = pb1 + b2 + b3, where a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ Z and
0 < a3, b3 < 1
(ab) mod p = (a1b1p
2 + a1b2p+ a2b1p+ a1b3p+ b1a3p+ a2b2 + a2b3 + b2a3 + a3b3) mod p
= (a1b3p+ b1a3p) mod p+ (a2b2 + a2b3 + b2a3 + a3b3) mod p
= (a1b3p+ b1a3p) mod p+ (a mod p)(b mod p) mod p
Since a3 and b3 are not integer, the term a1b3p + b1a3p may not be an
51
integer multiple of p, therefore it does not equal to 0 when taking modulo p.
The error term ∆ where ∆ = [(ab) mod p− (a mod p)(b mod p) mod p] can
be calculated as:
∆ = (a1b3p+ b1a3p) mod p
Due to this error term ∆ our proposed scheme does not satisfy v1 ≈
round(R3 ∗ v2) mod p.
Another method to correlate the two vaults is to try to match them
without applying any rotation. As proven in Lemma 2, the probability to
link the two hashed vault points created by our proposed hash function,
that uses the same minutia point but different α, β, γ values, is lower than a
security parameter . This lemma can be generalized for the probability to
link the two hashed vaults created by our proposed hash function, that uses
the same fingerprint but different α, β, γ values. Recall that for linking two
vaults, at least k of the genuine points should match.
Our empirical results show that δ is a 2 bit number and pi is a 7 bit
number. Therefore, P [C|Dτ ] = (2δpi )3 = (23/27)3 = 2−12. Also the empirical
value τ is 3 degrees, and the number of modulus triplets we can use is around
303, where q = 500. So the probability P [Dτ ] = ((1803 )× 30)−3 ≈ 2−32.
Note that P [C|Dτ ] is the probability of one random point matched to
a fixed point. Let L be the event of linking two vaults, P [L|Dτ ] is the
probability that at least k of the n genuine points are randomly matched.
This probability is less than two times of the probability of exactly k of the
n genuine points matched since the probability exponentially decreases when
the number of points matched increase.
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P [L|Dτ ] ≤ 2×
 n
k + 1
 (2−12)k (8)
Note that P [L|Dτ ] is a lot smaller than P [Dτ ] where k = 10 is a constant.
P [L] = P [L|Dτ ]P [Dτ ] + P [L|Dτ ]P [Dτ ]
≤ P [L|Dτ ] + P [Dτ ]
< 2× P [Dτ ] < 2−31 (9)
The result above shows that if a person affiliates to two different databases
with the same finger, the probability that these two enrollments can be cor-
related is less than  where  = 2−31. This result can be used to answer
the question: “What is the minimum number of databases one should affil-
iate such that the expected probability for finding one collusion is at least
50%?”. This problem can be adapted to the birthday paradox [28], where
the number of databases is the number of people and 1/ is the number of
possible birthdays. According to the birthday paradox, if one person affili-
ates to
√
1/ = 215,5 different databases with the same finger, at least one
pair of templates can be corrolated with probability 1/2.
Now let us assume that there are only two databases and there are N peo-
ple that are affiliated to both databases with the same finger. The probability
that at least one person’s two enrollments can be correlated is 1− (1− )N .
Note that 1−  is the probability of two templates of one person is not cor-
related and (1 − )N is the probability of none of the two templates of N
people is not correlated.
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The birthday attack can also be adapted to the case with N people, again
assigning a 0.5 probability of random collusion. The minimum number of
databases one should affiliate such that the expected probability for finding
one collusion for at least one pair of templates of one person is at least 50%
will be
√
1
1−(1−)N
Moreover, suppose a smart attacker found a way to rotate the vault with-
out loosing too much precision. The correlation can only be possible if both
vaults are in the same space. Two vaults are in the same space if they are
created by using the same modulo (i.e. p1, p2, p3 are equal to p
′
1, p
′
2, p
′
3 respec-
tively). The fuzzy vault scheme is still secure against that attack since the
probability that the two matching vaults are hashed with the same modulus
is 1/303 for our empirical values. Moreover Kholmatov et al. [6] calculated
that, for two dimensional classical vaults, linking an unknown vault to a
set with 400 vaults is possible for only 40% of all the cases. Since in this
new method we are loosing some precision, this probability will be lower.
Therefore, this attack can successfully link two matching vaults with some
probability less than 0.000037% if some smart rotation method that we do
not know, is found.
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9 Test Results
We implement polynomial reconstruction phase with both of two previously
discussed approaches: 1) brute force method and 2) RS decoding.
For the tests we use a database of 180 people where there are two fin-
gerprint images for each finger, for a total of 360 fingerprints. The first 180
fingerprint images are used for enrollment and the second 180 images are
used for verification of the corresponding fingerprints. Later, all fingerprints
are cross-tested for false accept rates. In the experimental setting bitmap
images of 500× 500 pixels are created for each fingerprint.
All computations and tests are performed on a computer with 1.7 GHz
Intel Celeron M processor and 448MB of RAM. The codes are developed in
either MATLAB or C++ (Microsoft Visual Studio) depending on the nature
of the problem.
We investigate two issues; firstly, the effects of the vault and threshold
sizes on the performance and security of the fuzzy vault, and secondly, time
efficiencies of the two methods used in the polynomial reconstruction phase
of the verification stage.
9.1 Effects of Vault and Threshold Sizes and Usage of
Hash Function
The false reject rates (FRR) and false accept rates (FAR) are calculated in six
settings where different values for vault size and minimum distance threshold
are used for our database of fingerprints. We use vault sizes of 200, 250 and
300 points and minimum distance threshold between a genuine and a chaff
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point is tested for (t = 15) and (t = 18). The minimum distance between
any two chaff points is taken as 8. We calculate the FAR and FRR results
for both the brute force and the RS decoding methods.
The FAR rates is 0% in all settings after cross testing all fingerprint
images with different fingers in the six settings.
Table 3: FRR without hashing in four different settings
Vault Size
Threshold (t) 200 250 300
15 2.78% 4.45% 6.65%
18 1.12% 1.67% 2.78%
Table 3 shows the FRRs for different vault sizes and threshold values.
The results clearly demonstrate that as the minimum distance between two
points increases, the possibility of a genuine point matching to a chaff point
decreases resulting in lower FRRs. Although the two values of threshold
used in the experiments have the same security level, increasing it further
may become impossible after a certain point since we cannot place as many
points as needed. Similarly, when more chaff points are added to the vault,
the possibility of a genuine point matching to a chaff point increases. Larger
vault size results in higher security. The security impact of vault size was
analyzed in Section 7.3.
We also calculated the false reject rates (FRR) and false accept rates
(FAR) in six settings when the proposed hash function is used, where different
values for vault size (C) and modulus (p) is used in the same database of
fingerprints. We use vault sizes of 200, 250 and 300 points, random modulus
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triplet of (p = (p1, p2, p3)) where pi is a random prime between 100 and 250
and we fix the minimum distance threshold to t = 18.
The FAR rates are still 0% in all settings after cross testing all fingerprint
images with different fingers in the six settings. The FRRs for the different
vault sizes and modulus values when the hash function is used, are presented
in Table 4.
Vault Size(C)
Modulus (p) 200 250 300
(197, 163, 181) 2.78% 4.45% 6.1%
(191, 157, 173) 3.33% 4.45% 6.65%
Table 4: FRR with hashing in six different settings
Table 4 shows the FRRs for different vault sizes and modulus values.
The results clearly demonstrates that as larger modulus values are used,
the precision loss from the original data decreases resulting in lower FRR.
Similarly, when more chaff points are added to the vault, the possibility of
a genuine point matching to a chaff point increases resulting in higher FRR.
Although larger vault size results in higher security, due to higher FRR,
increasing the vault size further is not feasible.
9.2 Timing Results for Polynomial Reconstruction Phase
As explained before, the verification phase is the main part where two ap-
proaches are compared in terms of timing and success performance. The
“Number Theory Library” (NTL) [29] is used for all the operations in the
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polynomial reconstruction. For both approaches, the polynomial reconstruc-
tion algorithms take two vectors x = {x1, x2, . . . , xm} and y = {y1, y2, . . . , ym}
where yi = P (xi) for the points matched to a genuine point and yi 6= P (xi)
for the points matched to a chaff point.
We first compare the timing results of the two approaches using our
database of real fingerprints. In case of true fingerprints we find that for
15% of the data, the RS decoding approach is faster. For non-matching fin-
gerprints, the RS decoding method is naturally always faster since concluding
that a fingerprint is non-matching takes 1000 trials which is a fixed value in
our experiments.
Considering that the database used in the experiments may not fully rep-
resent all cases, especially the ones with high levels of noise in the measure-
ment process, we use synthetic data to control the number of matched points
in the alignment process. We generate synthetic fingerprints and correspond-
ing fuzzy vaults of 350 total points, where the number of matched points are
in the range of [21, 35]. Timing results of the experiment for changing number
of genuine matched points where the total number of matched points is fixed
are shown in Figure 11. As clearly observed in the figure, the brute force
method takes much longer when the number of genuine matching points are
low due to excessive number of trials to find the correct matching points. As
the number of matching points increases, the brute force becomes faster. We
also provide the same graphic for number of operations in Figure 12, that
we obtain in our theoretical analysis. The similarity of the two figures show
that the experimental results are in line with the theoretical analysis. It is
important to note that the reason for timing results of RS decoding is worse
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than the operational complexity of RS decoding is that we did not consider
the cost of function calls while calculating the operational complexites of the
method.
Figure 11: Timing results of two methods with varying number of matched
points
The experiments demonstrate that the optimal method changes depend-
ing on the number of genuine points matched. The brute force approach
is faster if the matching is very good (i.e. most of the minutiae points are
matched to genuine points) since it will require very few trials to find the
polynomial. On the other hand, the RS decoder is very fast to reject a
forgery since brute force will require excessive number of trials to decide on
a reject. Also for a weak matching of a valid fingerprint, the RS decoder is
again faster.
59
Figure 12: Operational complexities of two methods with varying number of
matched points
10 Conclusion
In this thesis, we addressed the implementation, security, and performance
issues of fuzzy vault for biometric identification. We first provided a guideline
that explains the implementation steps of decoding using two methods: brute
force and Reed-Solomon (RS) in a detailed way. We then compared the
efficiencies of the two methods. The results shows that for weak matching,
the RS decoding method is more efficient; but for good matching, the brute
force method works faster. For the success rate of verification, they both give
the same false accept rate (FAR) and false reject rate (FRR).
We proposed a new chaff point placement method to prevent some infer-
ences on the location of genuine points. By adjusting the distance between
points (genuine-to-chaff and chaff-to-chaff) we showed that it is possible to
increase security of the fuzzy vault implementation.
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We explored the effects and limitations of the vault size on the security
and performance of the fuzzy vault. The higher number of chaff points in the
vault is demonstrated to strengthen the method against the most successful
attack. However, placing more chaff points takes more time and becomes
impossible after a certain number of points and has an adverse effect on the
FRR rate.
We proposed to embed a number of fake polynomials in the fuzzy vault
along with the secret polynomial to reduce the success rate of the attacker.
We succeeded in placing only limited number of fake polynomials in the vault.
We believe that further research will reveal more efficient methods to place
a higher number of fake polynomials in the vault, that will further increase
the security.
We also proposed a special hash function that allows us to perform the
matching in the hash space. This method makes the correlation attack in-
applicable to our proposed fuzzy vault system which is shown by the security
analysis of this hashing method.
As some suggestions for future work, a matcher with helper data can
be implemented to observe the effects of this matcher to the efficiency and
successful authentication rates. Another issue is considering a hybrid solution
instead of brute force and Reed Solomon. This hybrid version might run brute
force a small predefined number of times, say `, at most; if the fingerprint
is accepted the program terminates; otherwise run the RSDecoder to decide.
Moreover, whether this public helper data leaks any information about the
biometric should also be considered and detailed analysis should be provided.
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